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Having  shown  that  from  a  static  point  of  view  the  quantity  of  money  was 
unimportant,  Hume  went  on  to  show  that  from  a  dynamic  point  of  view 
changes  in  the  quantity  of  money  could  have  a very  important  influence. 
Lionel  Robbins 
The  Theory  of  Economic  Development 
in  the  History  of  Economic  Thought 
Many  economists  no  doubt  would  agree  that  the 
strict  classical  quantity  theory  of  money  is  logically 
incompatible  with  the  concept  of  a  stable,  long-run 
Phillips  curve  tradeoff  between  output  and  inflation. 
For,  according  to  the  quantity  theory,  equilibrium 
changes  in  the  money  stock  alter  only  prices  and  have 
no  lasting  impact  on  real  variables.  By  contrast,  the 
Phillips  curve  hypothesis  holds  that  inflationary 
money  growth  can  permanently  raise  the  level  of  real 
output  and  employment.  How  could  any  economist 
simultaneously  adhere  to  these  two  apparently  con- 
tradictory  views? 
The  foregoing  question  is  central  to  a  current 
controversy  over  the  contributions  of  David  Hume 
(1711-1776),  the  great  eighteenth  century  Scottish 
philosopher-historian-economist,  to  monetary  theory. 
Thomas  Mayer,  for  example,  argues  that  Hume 
implicitly  rejected  the  Phillips  curve  tradeoff  because 
it  was  inconsistent  with  his  quantity  theory.  Thus 
Mayer  states  that  whereas 
The  quantity  theory  was  obviously  central  to 
Hume’s  economics.  .  .  .  The  absence  of  a  long-run 
tradeoff  between  unemployment  and  inflation  was 
also  central  to  Hume  because,  if  such  a  tradeoff 
exists,  it  weakens  .  .  the  quantity  theory,  since 
prices  then do not  rise in  proportion  to the increase 
in  the  quantity  of  money.  [4;  pp.  98,  99] 
Similarly,  Jacob  Frenkel  cites  Hume’s  belief  in  the 
quantity  theory’s  neutrality  proposition  (according 
to  which  a  money  stock  change  has  no  lasting  effect 
on  real  variables)  as  evidence  of  Hume’s  rejection 
of  the  Phillips  curve.  Says  Frenkel: 
. . . there is evidence  that  Hume  did not  believe  in a 
stable,  long-run  Phillips  curve.  .  .  .  The  over- 
whelming  general  tendency  of  Hume’s  writings  and 
one  of  the  most  important  characteristics  of  his 
monetary  theory  has  been  the  proposition  concern- 
ing  the  neutrality  of  money.  .  .  .  [which  states 
that] monetary  policy  exerts  no  long-run  real 
effects.  [2;  pp.  490,  492] 
Frenkel  and  Mayer  admit,  of  course,  that  Hume 
acknowledged  that  money  could  affect  output  and 
employment  temporarily  during  a  transitional  adjust- 
ment  period.  But  they  contend  that  he  felt  that  these 
temporary  real  effects  would  eventually  vanish,  leav- 
ing  no  long-run  tradeoff.  This  view  is  disputed  by 
Charles  Nelson,  who  claims  that  Hume  did  indeed 
believe  in  a  long-run  tradeoff  and  that  he  was  unique 
in  doing  so.  Says  Nelson, 
Hume  was  clearly  of  the  opinion  that  the  level 
of  activity  would  be  raised  permanently  by  a 
steady  increase  in  the  quantity  of  money,  prices 
and  wages.  Hume  was  therefore  a  believer  in 
stable,  long-run  Phillips  curves  and  perhaps  the 
only  serious  economist  to  have  so  committed  him- 
self  in  print!  [5;  p.  2.  Italics  in  original.] 
The  purpose  of  this  article  is  to  show  that  both  of 
the  foregoing  interpretations  are  at  least  partly  mis- 
taken:  that,  contrary  to  the  contention  of  Frenkel 
and  Mayer,  Hume  did  believe  in  both  the  quantity 
theory  and  a  stable  long-run  Phillips  curve  and  saw 
no  inconsistency  in  doing  so;  that,  contrary  to 
Nelson’s  suggestion,  Hume  was  not  alone  in  accept- 
ing  the  long-run  Phillips  curve  but  was  joined  by 
Henry  Thornton  (1760-1815),  perhaps  the  leading 
monetary  theorist  of  the  nineteenth  century  British 
classical  school;  and  finally,  that  neither  Hume  nor 
Thornton  contended  that  the  real  effects  of  a  steady, 
sustained  rate  of  money  growth  were  confined  to  a 
temporary  transition  period  but  thought  those  effects 
could  persist  indefinitely.  More  precisely,  the  article 
shows  that  both  Hume  and  Thornton  distinguished 
between  levels  and rates of  change  of  the  money 
stock,  that  they  held  the  former  to  be  neutral  and  the 
latter  nonneutral  with  respect  to  real  economic  vari- 
ables,  and  that  this  distinction  reconciles  their  belief 
in  both  the  quantity  theory  and  the  long-run  Phillips 
curve.  The  article  also  shows  that,  although  both 
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stable  long-run  Phillips  curve,  they  differed  regard- 
ing  the  desirability  of  exploiting  that  relationship  for 
policy  purposes-Hume  favoring  and  Thornton  op- 
posing  such  a  policy.  The  views  of  Hume  and 
Thornton  are  important  not  only  because  they 
demonstrate  that  at  least  two  leading  classical  quan- 
tity  theorists  accepted  the  Phillips  curve,  but  also 
because  they  illustrate  how  opposing  policy  prescrip- 
tions  can  derive  from  the  same  underlying  theoretical 
framework. 
David  Hume  (1711-1776) 
To  demonstrate  that  Hume  and  Thornton  adhered 
to  both  the  quantity  theory  and  the  long-run  Phillips 
curve,  it  is  sufficient  to  show 
(1)  that  they  stated  the  quantity  theory  in 
terms  of  its  neutrality  and  equiproportionality 
propositions,  and 
(2)  that  they  contrasted  the  short-run  nonneu- 
trality  and  the  long-run  neutrality  of  changes  in 
money  stock  levels  with  the  long-run  nonneutrality 
of rates  of  monetary  change. 
That  is,  it  must  be  shown  that  they  distinguished  be- 
tween  neutral  alternative  levels  and  nonneutral  rates 
of change  of  the  money  stock  and  that  they  employed 
this  distinction  to  reconcile  their  belief  in  the  quantity 
theory  with  their  belief  in  the  Phillips  curve. 
First  consider  Hume,  whose  contributions  to 
monetary  theory  are  contained  in  his  famous  essays 
“Of  Money,"  “Of  Interest,”  and  “Of  the  Balance  of 
Trade,”  all  originally  published  in  1752.  He  starts 
out  by  enunciating  the  quantity  theory’s  equipro- 
portionality  and  neutrality  propositions  according  to 
which  an  equilibrium  rise  in  the  quantity  of  money 
causes  an  equiproportional  rise  in  nominal  prices  and 
leaves  all  real  variables  unchanged.  He  says: 
If  we  consider  any  one  kingdom  by  itself,  it  is 
evident,  that  the  greater  or  less  plenty  of  money 
is  of  no  consequence;  since  the  prices  of  commodi- 
ties  are  always  proportioned  to  the  plenty  of 
money,  and  a  crown  in  HARRY  VII’s  time  served 
the  same  purpose  as  a  pound  does  at  present.  .  .  . 
Where  coin  is  in  greater  plenty;  as  a  greater 
quantity  of  it  is  required  to  represent  the  same 
quantity  of  goods;  it  can  have  no  effect,  either 
good  or  bad,  taking  a  nation  within  itself;  any 
more  than  it  would  make  an  alteration  on  a  mer- 
chant’s  books,  if,  instead  of  the  ARABIAN  method 
of  notation,  which  requires  few  characters,  he 
should  make  use of  the  ROMAN,  which  requires  a 
great  many.  [3;  pp.  33,  37] 
Hume  realized  that  these  comparative  static  propo- 
sitions  apply  only  to  equilibrium  levels  of  the  money 
stock  after  all  adjustments  have  occurred.  In  Eugene 
Rotwein’s  words,  Hume  “distinguishes  between  the 
ultimate  effect  of a higher  absolute  quantity  of money 
as  such  and  the  effect  of  the  process  of  change  to  a 
larger  quantity  of  money.  It  is  to  the  former  alone 
that  the  quantity  theory  applies.”  [8;  p.  lxiii] 
Hume  notes,  however,  that  during  the  adjustment 
from  the  old  to  the  new  equilibrium  level,  money  can 
temporarily  affect  real  variables.  He  attributes  those 
real  effects  chiefly  to  the  existence  of  two  delays  or 
time-lags  in  the  adjustment  process.  The  first  is  the 
lag  of  prices  behind  money,  which,  by  raising  the 
actual  quantity  of  money  relative  to  the  amount 
required  to  purchase  given  output  at  existing  prices, 
generates  a  rise  in  aggregate  real  demand  as  people 
attempt  to  get  rid  of  the  excess  money  by  spending 
it  on  real  goods  and  services.  The  second  is  the  lag 
of  money  wages  behind  prices,  which,  by  lowering 
real  wages,  leads  to  an  increase  in  hiring  and  hence 
production.  In  Hume’s  view  the  first  lag  produces 
the  increased  real  demand  that  justifies  output  ex- 
pansion  whereas  the  second  lag  produces  the  cost 
conditions  that  make  that  expansion  profitable.  Rein- 
forcing  the  effect  of  these  lags  are  several  supple- 
mentary  sources  of  nonneutrality,  including  (1)  the 
nonneutral  initial  distribution  of  the  new  money,  (2) 
the  fact  that  the  monetary  injection  and  the  corre- 
sponding  new  equilibrium  price  level  are  at  first 
unperceived,  and  (3)  shifts  in  the  structure  of  rela- 
tive  prices  owing  to  the  failure  of  all  product  prices 
to  adjust  with  equal  speed  to  generalized  inflationary 
pressure.  Hume  elaborates  : 
To  account,  then,  for  this  phenomenon,  we  must 
consider,  that  though  the high  price  of  commodities 
be a  necessary  consequence  of  the  encrease  of  gold 
and  silver,  yet  it follows  not  immediately  upon  that 
encrease;  but  some  time  is  required  before  the 
money  circulates  through  the  whole  state,  and 
makes  its  effect  be  felt  on  all  ranks  of  people.  At 
first,  no  alteration  is  perceived;  by  degrees  the 
price  rises,  first  of  one commodity,  then of  another; 
till  the whole  at last  reaches  a just  proportion  with 
the new quantity  of  specie  which  is in the kingdom. 
In  my  opinion.,  it  is  only  in  this  interval  or  inter- 
mediate  situation,  between  the acquisition  of  money 
and  rise  of  prices,  that  the  encreasing  quantity  of 
gold  and  silver  is  favourable  to  industry. 
Here  are  the  temporary  effects  of  (1)  the  lag  in 
prices  behind  money,  (2)  the  perception  lag,  and 
(3)  the  transitory  shift  in  relative  prices. 
Hume  continues,  emphasizing  the  impact  of  the 
unequal  initial  distribution  of  the  new  money  and 
especially  the  employment  and  output  effects  of  the 
lag  in  money  wages. 
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nation,  it is not  at  first  dispersed  into  many  hands, 
but is confined  to the coffers  of  a few  persons,  who 
immediately  seek to  employ  it  to  advantage.  Here 
are  a  set of  manufacturers  or  merchants,  we  shall 
suppose,  who  have  received  returns  of  gold  and 
silver  for  goods  which  they  sent  to  CADIZ.  They 
are  thereby  enabled  to employ  more  workmen  than 
formerly,  who  never  dream  of  demanding  higher 
wages,  but  are glad  of  employment  from  such  good 
paymasters.  If  workmen  become  scarce,  the manu- 
facturer  gives  higher  wages,  but  at  first  requires 
an  increase  of  labour,  and  this  is  willingly  sub- 
mitted  to  by  the  artisan,  who  can  now  eat  and 
drink  better,  to  compensate  his  additional  toil  and 
fatigue.  He carries  his  money  to market,  where  he 
finds  every  thing  at  the  same  price  as  formerly, 
but  returns  with  greater  quantity  and  of  better 
kinds,  for  the  use  of  his  family.  The  farmer  and 
gardener,  finding,  that  all  their  commodities  are 
taken  off,  apply  themselves  with  alacrity  to  the 
raising  more;  and  at  the  same  time  can  afford  to 
take  better  and  more  cloths  from  their  tradesmen, 
whose  price  is  the  same  as  formerly,  and  their 
industry  only  whetted  by  so much  new  gain.  It  is 
easy  to  trace  the  money  in  its  progress  through 
the whole  commonwealth;  where  we shall  find,  that 
it must  first  quicken  the diligence  of  every  individ- 
ual,  before  it  encrease  the  price  of  labour.  [3; 
pp.  37-38] 
But  these  real  effects  are  temporary  and  vanish 
once  wages  and  prices  fully  adjust  to  the  new  higher 
level  of  the  money  stock.  As  Hume  himself  put  it, 
. . . it  is  only  in  this  interval  or  intermediate  situ- 
ation,  between  the  acquisition  of  money  and  rise 
of  prices,  that  the  encreasing  quantity  of  gold  and 
silver  is  favourable  to  industry.  .  .  .  but  after  the 
prices  are  settled,  suitably  to  the  new  abundance 
of  gold  and  silver,  it  has  no  manner  of  influence. 
[3;  pp.  33,  48] 
In  short,  a  one-time  increase  in  the  level  of  the 
money  stock  has  no  permanent,  lasting  influence  on 
real  activity.  That  is,  a  one-time  rise  in  the  quantity 
of  money  generates  only  a  temporary  tradeoff. 
attempts  to  catch  up  with  it.1  As  a  result,  real  cash 
balances  would  rise  (thus  stimulating  spending)  and 
real  wages  would  fall  (thus  stimulating  employment). 
These  stimuli  would  persist  indefinitely,  allowing  a 
permanent  expansion  in  the  level  of  real  activity. 
To  illustrate  how  a  sustained  increase  in  the  quan- 
tity  of  money  can  permanently  raise  activity,  Hume 
refers  to  the  observed  real  growth  performance  of 
the  nations  of  Western  Europe  since  the  opening  of 
the  gold  mines  in  America  in  the  sixteenth  century. 
. . . it  is  certain  [he  says]  that.  since  the discovery 
of  the mines  in  AMERICA,  industry  has  encreased 
in  all  the  nations  of  EUROPE  .  .  .  and  this  may 
justly  be  ascribed,  amongst  other  reasons,  to  the 
encrease  of  gold  and  silver.  Accordingly  we  find, 
that,  in every  kingdom,  into  which  money  begins  to 
flow  in  greater  abundance  than  formerly,  every 
thing  takes  a  new  face:  labour  and  industry  gain 
life;  the  merchant  becomes  more  enterprising,  the 
manufacturer  more  diligent  and  skilful,  and  even 
the farmer  follows  his  plough  with  greater  alacrity 
and  attention.  [3;  p.  37] 
Note  that  Hume  is  here  referring  to  roughly  200 
years  of  monetary  expansion.  This  expansion,  he 
says,  has  permanently  raised  the  level  of  real  activity. 
For  Hume  it  is  the  rate  of  change  of  money  and  not 
its  quantity  that  matters  for  real  variables-a  point 
he  underscores  in  two  additional  passages.  In  the 
first  passage  he  contrasts  the  economic  performance 
of  two  hypothetical  nations,  the  money  stocks  of 
which,  though  identical  in  size,  are  changing  at  differ- 
ent  rates.  He  says,  “A  nation,  whose  money  de- 
creases,  is  actually,  at  that  time,  weaker  and  more 
miserable  than  another  nation,  who  possesses  no 
more  money  but  is  on  the  encreasing  hand.”  [3;  p. 
40]  That  is,  whether  real  activity  is  permanently 
raised  or  lowered  depends  upon  whether  the  rate  of 
Long-Run  Tradeoff 
According  to  Hume,  however,  the  same  is  not  true 
of  a  steady  succession  of  such  monetary  increases. 
He  thought  such  increases  would,  if  maintained 
over  a  continuous  series  of  transitional  adjustment 
periods,  exert  permanent  real  effects.  That  is,  he 
asserted  the  real  significance  of  a  sustained  mone- 
tary  expansion,  thereby  prompting  Adam  Smith’s 
remark  that  “Mr.  Hume’s  reasoning  is  exceedingly 
ingenious.  He  seems,  however,  to  have  gone  a  little 
into  the  notion  that  public  opulence  consists  in 
money.”  [9;  p.  197  quoted  in  7;  p.  136]  Implicitly 
assuming  that  expectations  of  future  inflation  would 
always  be  zero  and  therefore  would  never  enter  wage 
and  price  demands,  Hume  claimed  that  a  continually 
expanding  money  stock  would  forever  march  ahead 
of  wages  and  prices,  perpetually  frustrating  their 
1 Hume’s  omission  of  inflationary  expectations  may  be 
explained  on  at  least  three  grounds.  First,  he  was  de- 
scribing  a world  metallic  inflation  rate quite  low  (1  to  3 
percent  per  year  on  average)  by  modern  standards, 
perhaps  too  low  to reach the minimum  perception  thresh- 
old  required  for  the generation  of  inflation  expectations. 
Second,  given  a  metallic  monetary  standard,  one  could 
argue  on  profitability  grounds  that  the  expected  long- 
term  inflation  rate is zero.  The  reason,  of  course,  is that 
if  the  stock  of  monetary  metal  were  initially  expanding 
at  an  inflationary  pace  so  as  to  raise  the  metal  price  of 
goods  and  labor.  the  resulting  fall  in  the  purchasing 
power  of  metal  combined  with  the  rising  labor  cost  of 
mining  it would  induce  mineowners  to  cut  back  metallic 
production  to  noninflationary  levels.  In  other  words, 
the inflationary  overproduction  of  gold  would,  by  lower- 
ing  its  value  relative  to  other  goods,  render  the  latter 
more  profitable  to  produce  than  gold,  thereby  automat- 
ically  checking  gold’s  overproduction.  Reinforcing  this 
price-stabilizing  production  effect  would  be  a shift  in  the 
demand  for  gold  from  monetary  to  nonmonetary  uses  as 
gold’s  value  as  money  declines.  Third,  the  discovery  of 
gold  and  silver  mines  in  the  New  World  could  be  re- 
garded  as  random,  fortuitous  events  having  an  expected 
value  of  approximately  zero.  For  these reasons,  Hume’s 
implicit  assumption  of  zero  expected  inflation  is perhaps 
understandable. 
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(and  of  course  the  wage/price  lag  associated  with  it) 
is  “as  pernicious  to  industry,  when  gold  and  silver 
are  diminishing,  as  it  is  advantageous  when  these 
metals  are  encreasing.”  Specifically,  in  the  deflation- 
ary  case  of  negative  money  growth,  “The  workman 
has  not  the  same  employment  from  the  manufacturer 
and  merchant;  though  he  pays  the  same  price  for 
everything  in  the  market.  The  farmer  cannot  dispose 
of  his  corn  and  cattle;  though  he  must  pay  the  same 
rent  to  his  landlord.  The  poverty,  and  beggary,  and 
sloth,  which  must  ensue  are  easily  foreseen.”  [3;  p. 
40]  Here  is  Hume’s  stress  on  the  real  significance 
and  insignificance,  respectively,  of  rates  of  change 
versus  absolute  quantities  of  money.  This  emphasis 
is  also  manifest  in  the  second  passage,  in  which  he 
concludes 
.  .  .  that  it  is  of  no  matter  of  consequence,  with 
regard  to  the  domestic  happiness  of  a  state, 
whether  money  be  in  a  greater  or  less  quantity. 
The  good  policy  of  the  magistrate  consists  only  in 
keeping  it,  if  possible,  still  encreasing;  because, 
by  that  means,  he  keeps  alive  a  spirit  of  industry 
in  the nation,  and  encreases  the  stock  of  labour,  in 
which  consists  all  real  power  and  riches.  [3;  pp. 
Regarding  this  passage,  Blaug  notes  that.,  Hume’s 
“demand  for  a  continual  inflow  of  precious  metals 
amounts  to  a  demand  for  a  continuous  series  of  tran- 
sitional  periods”  during  which  inflationary  money 
growth  repeatedly  and  permanently  stimulates  trade. 
[1;  p.  20]  Here  is  Hume’s  adherence  to  the  long- 
run  Phillips  curve.  Here  also  is  his  reconciliation  of 
that  concept  with  his  quantity  theory.  There  is  no 
conflict  between  the  two  theories,  he  thought,  since 
the  one  refers  to  rates  of  change  and  the  other  to 
alternative  levels  of  the  money  stock. 
Henry  Thornton  (1760-1815) 
The  preceding  has  argued  that,  in  Nelson’s  words, 
Hume  was  careful  to distinguish  between  the effect 
of  alternative  levels  of  the  quantity  of  money  and 
the  effect  of  a  changing  quantity  of  money.  He 
clearly  regarded  the  level  to  be  of  little  or  no  real 
consequence.  .  .  .  Hume  regarded  only  the  rate  of 
change  of  money  as  having  real  significance,  but 
of  such  significance  as  to  allow  a  long-run  trade- 
off  between  output  and  inflation.  There  is  nothing 
in  Hume’s  analysis  of  monetary  dynamics  which 
implies  that  the  trade-off  cannot  be  sustained  .  .  . 
[6;  pp.  494-495] 
This  same  description  applies  to  Henry  Thornton, 
whose  analysis  of  the  quantity  theory  and  the  output/ 
inflation  tradeoff  are  contained  in  his  classic  An 
Enquiry  into  the  Nature  and  Effects  of  the  Paper 
Credit  of  Great  Britain  (1802).  Like  Hume,  he 
defines  the  tradeoff  in  terms  that  are  at  once  succinct 
and  unambiguous: 
.  .  .  additional  industry  will  be  one  effect  of  an 
extraordinary  emission  of  paper,  a  rise  in  the  cost 
of  articles  will  be  another. 
Probably  no small  part  of  that  industry  which  is 
excited  by  new  paper  is  produced  through  the very 
means  of  the  enhancement  of  the cost  of  commodi- 
ties.  [10;  p.  237] 
Also  like  Hume,  he  distinguished  between  levels 
and  rates  of  change  of  the  money  stock,  holding  that 
only  the  latter  can  affect  real  activity  and  sustain  the 
tradeoff.  This  is  epitomized  in  his  remark  that  “it  is 
the  progressive  augmentation  of  bank  paper,  and  not 
the  magnitude  of  its  existing  amount,  which  gives 
the  relief.”  [10;  p.  256]  In  other  words,  money 
stimulates  activity  only  when  it  is  continually  in- 
creasing.  For,  says  Thornton,  “While  paper  is  en- 
creasing,  and  articles  continue  rising,  mercantile 
speculations  appear  more  than  ordinarily  profitable.” 
But  “as  soon,  .  .  . as  the  circulating  medium  ceases 
to  encrease,  the  extra  profit  is  at  an  end,”  and  the 
stimulus  vanishes.  [10;  p.  238]  Thus  a  one-time 
rise  in  the  money  stock  cannot  sustain  the  tradeoff. 
Instead,  a  continuous  increase  or  “progressive  aug- 
mentation”  is  required.  Here  is  the  long-run  non- 
neutrality  of  rates  of  change  of  the  money  stock  that 
underlies  Thornton’s  version  of  the  Phillips  curve 
tradeoff. 
As  for  the  tradeoff  itself,  Thornton,  like  Hume, 
attributed  it  chiefly  to  a  tendency  for  money  wages 
to  consistently  lag  behind  prices.  He  explicitly  stated 
(1)  that  inflation  stimulates  activity,  (2)  that  it  does 
so  by  reducing  real  wages  and  raising  real  profits, 
(3)  that  this  output-enhancing  redistribution  occurs 
because  money  wages  lag  behind  prices,  and  (4)  that 
this  wage  lag  persists  as  long  as  inflation  is sustained. 
Neither  he  nor  Hume  explained  why  the  lag  would 
persist  nor  did  they  allow  for  the  formation  of  infla- 
tionary  expectations.  Because  of  this  they  did  not 
attempt  to  explain  why  wages  would  not  eventually 
catch  up  with  prices  once  inflationary  expectations 
had  fully  adjusted  to  actual  inflation.  In  short,  their 
analysis  is  largely  silent  about  price  anticipations; 
they  did  not  incorporate  inflationary  expectations 
into  the  Phillips  curve.2 
2 Thornton’s  omission  of  price expectations  in his analysis 
of  the  labor  market  is  hard  to  rationalize.  After  all.  he 
explicitly  recognized  the  role  of  exchange  rate  expecta- 
tions  in  his  discussion  of  the  determination  of  foreign 
exchange  rates.  Moreover,  he  spelled  out  a  fairly  com- 
plete  theory  of  the  inflation-generating  process  in  an 
inconvertible  paper  currency  regime.  A  logical  next 
step would  have been  to explain  how  people  form  expec- 
tations  of  future  inflation  consistent  with  that  inflation- 
generating  mechanism.  Perhaps  his  omission  of  price 
expectations  reflected  his belief  that Britain  would  return 
to  the  gold  standard  at  pre-Napoleonic  war  prices  such 
that  the  long-run  expected  rate  of  inflation  was  zero. 
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Thornton  did,  however,  introduce  one  new  element 
into  the  analysis,  namely  the  celebrated  forced-saving 
doctrine which  later  played  a  leading  role  in  the 
Austrian  business  cycle  theory  of  von  Mises  and 
Hayek.  As  enunciated  by  Thornton,  this  doctrine 
refers  to  the  potential  rise  in  the  rate  of  capital  ac- 
cumulation  and  hence  long-term  economic  growth 
owing  to  the  inflation-induced  redistribution  from 
wages  to  profit.  This  forced  saving  effect,  which 
assumes  for  its  existence  that  capitalists  have  a higher 
propensity  to  save  and  invest  out  of  real  income  than 
do  workers,  is  described  by  Thornton  as  follows: 
It  must  be also  admitted,  that,  provided  we assume 
an  excessive  issue  of  paper  to  lift  up,  as  it  may 
for  a time,  the cost  of  goods  though  not the price  of 
labour,  some  augmentation  of  [the  capital]  stock 
will  be the consequence;  for  the labourer,  according 
to  this  supposition,  may  be forced  by  his  necessity 
to  consume  fewer  articles,  though  he  may  exercise 
the  same  industry.  [10;  p.  239] 
He  then  goes  on  to  allude  to  the  possibility  of  “a 
similar  defalcation  of the  revenue  of  the  unproductive 
members  of  the  society,”  i.e.,  fixed-income  recipients. 
[10;  p.  239]  In  suggesting  that  the  rate  of  monetary 
growth  may  influence  the  rate  of  capital  accumula- 
tion,  Thornton  anticipated  a  key  feature  of  those 
modern  neoclassical  monetary  growth  models  that 
treat  investment  as  a function  of the  monetary  growth 
rate. 
Finally,  like  Hume,  Thornton  also  accepted  the 
quantity  theory  which  he  reconciled  with  the  Phillips 
curve  by  distinguishing  between  alternative  levels 
and  rates  of  change  of  the  money  stock.  He  states 
the  quantity  theory’s  neutrality  and  proportionality 
propositions  as  follows:  Money,  he  says, 
. . . is  an  article  of  such  a nature  . . . that  the vast 
encrease  of  it  , . . cannot  possibly  create  such a new 
capital  as  shall  furnish  the  new  paper  with  em- 
ployment.  There  remains,  therefore,  no other  mode 
of  accounting  for  the  uses  to  which  the  additional 
supply  of  it  can  be turned,  than  that  of  supposing 
it  to  be  occupied  in  carrying  on  the  sales  of  the 
same,  or  nearly  the  same,  quantity  of  articles  as 
before,  at an  advanced  price  the cost  of  goods  being 
made to bear  the same,  or nearly  the  same,  propor- 
tion  to  their  former  cost,  which  the  total  quantity 
of  paper  at  the  one period  bears  to  the  total  quan- 
tity  at  the  other.  [10;  p.  241] 
Exploiting  the  Phillips  Curve 
The  preceding  has  argued  that  both  Hume  and 
Thornton  accepted  the  Phillips  curve  and  that  they 
reconciled  it  with  their  belief  in  the  quantity  theory 
by  distinguishing  between  the  nonneutrality  of  rates 
of  monetary  change  and  the  neutrality  of  alternative 
levels  of  the  money  stock.  In  these  respects  at  least, 
they  were  in  perfect  agreement. 
They  differed,  however,  over  the  desirability  of 
exploiting  the  Phillips  curve  for  policy  purposes. 
Hume  clearly  believed  that  the  policy  authorities  in 
the  closed  world  economy  should  exploit  the  curve, 
using  monetary  gold  inflation  to  stimulate  output.3 
He  says  as  much  in  his  advice  to  the  policymaker. 
The  good  policy  of  the  magistrate  consists  only  in 
keeping  it,  if  possible,  still  encreasing;  because,  by 
that  means,  he  keeps  alive  a  spirit  of  industry  in 
the. nation,.  and  encreases  the  stock of  labour,  in 
which  consists  all  real  power  and  riches.  [3;  pp. 
In  contrast  to  Hume,  Thornton  was  much  less 
enthusiastic  about  the  desirability  of  exploiting  the 
Phillips  curve.  Such  exploitation  involved  inflation, 
which  he  saw  as  an  unmitigated  evil.4  All  inflation- 
ary  policy,  he  said,  is  “attended  with  a  proportionate 
hardship  and  injustice.”  [10; p.  239]  Most  impor- 
tant,  he  doubted  that  the  output  gains  would  be  large 
enough  to  be  worth  the  costs  (uncertainty,  injustice, 
social  discontent)  of  higher  inflation.  In  this  con- 
nection  he  repeatedly  stressed  (1)  that  the  economy 
normally  tends  to  operate  close  to  its  full  capacity 
constraint,  (2)  that  the  tradeoff  is  extremely  un- 
favorable  at  this  normal  operating  point,  allowing 
at  best  only  small  increases  in  output  per  unit  in- 
crease  in  inflation,  and  (3)  that  the  tradeoff  vanishes 
altogether  at  full  employment.  As  a  result,  stimu- 
lative  policy  would  almost  immediately  confront  the 
full  employment  barrier  where 
it  is  obvious,  that  the antecedently  idle  persons 
to  whom  we  may  suppose  the  new  capital  to  give 
employ,  are  limited  in  number;  and  that,  therefore, 
if  the  encreased  issue  is  indefinite,  it  will  set  to 
work  labourers,  of  whom  a part  will  be drawn  from 
other,  and,  perhaps,  no less useful  occupations.  [10; 
p.  236] 
3 Note  that  Hume  refers  to the benefits  of  metallic  infla- 
tion  only.  He  strongly  disapproved  of  paper  money 
inflation  which  he believed would  be excessive.  This  was 
on  the  grounds  that  there  existed  no  natural  forces  to 
limit  the rate  of  overissue  of  paper.  “I  scarcely  know,” 
he  says,  “any  method  of  sinking  money  below-its  level, 
but  those  institutions  of  .  .  .  paper  credit  which  are  so 
much  practiced  in this kingdom.”  [3;  pp. 67-68]  By  con- 
trast,  he felt  that  the rate of  metallic  inflation  would  be 
severely  limited  by  the difficulty  and expense  of  discover- 
ing  precious  metals  and  extracting  them  from  the earth. 
For  this  reason,  he  believed  that  the  metallic  inflation 
rate  would  be  low,  corresponding  to  the  slow,  steady 
accretion  of  the world  stock  of  monetary  gold  and  silver. 
On  this  basis,  he  concluded  that  provided  inflation  was 
of  the  metallic  kind,, higher  levels  of  real  activity  could 
be  obtained  at the  cost  of  only  moderate  inflation. 
4 Thornton feared  inflation  more  than did  Hume  because, 
at the time  he was  writing  (1802),  Britain was  operating 
with  an  inconvertible  paper currency  and  a  ceiling  bank 
loan  rate  of  interest  pegged  below  the  prevailing  profit 
rate  on  new  capital  investment.  Such  conditions, 
Thornton  noted,  created  the  potential  for  unlimited 
hyperinflation.  Indeed,  he pointed  out  that  France  had 
experienced  such  hyperinflation  during  the  infamous 
Assignats  episode. 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  RANK  OF  RICHMOND  17 In  short,  while  it  is  true  that  “paper  possesses  the 
faculty  of  enlarging  the  quantity  of  commodities  by 
giving  life  to  some  new  industry,”  the  full  employ- 
ment  constraint  ensures  that  “the  encrease  of industry 
will  by  no  means  keep  pace  with  the  augmentation  of 
paper.”  [10;  p.  239]  On  these  grounds  he  concluded 
that  there  exist  narrow  "bounds  to  the  benefit  which 
is  to  be  derived  from  an  augmentation  of  paper;  and, 
also,  that  a  liberal,  or,  at  most,  a  large  encrease  of  it, 
will  have  all  the  advantageous  effects  of  the  most 
extravagant  emission.”  [10;  p.  236] 
Concluding  Comments 
This  article  has  documented  the  following  con- 
clusions  : 
1.  Contrary  to  Frenkel  and  Mayer,  Hume  ac- 
cepted  both  the  quantity  theory  and  the  long- 
run  Phillips  curve  and  saw  no  inconsistency  in 
doing  so. 
2.  Contrary  to  Nelson,  Hume  was  not  alone  in 
accepting  the  Phillips  curve  but  was  joined  by 
Henry  Thornton. 
3.  Both  Hume  and  Thornton  reconciled  the  quan- 
tity  theory  with  the  Phillips  curve  by  distin- 
guishing  between  the  neutrality  of  alternative 
levels  and  the  nonneutrality  of  rates  of  change 
of  the  money  stock. 
4.  Hume  and  Thornton  differed  over  the  desir- 
ability  of exploiting  the  Phillips  curve  for  policy 
purposes-Hume  favoring  and  Thornton  op- 
posing  its  exploitation.  Hume’s  preference, 
however,  extended  only  to  metallic  inflation. 
5.  Neither  Hume  nor  Thornton  advocated  paper 
money  inflation.  Both  feared  that  such  inflation 
could  rapidly  accelerate  into  hyperinflation 
since  no  natural  forces  existed  to  limit  the  over- 
issue  of  inconvertible  paper. 
Hume  and  Thornton  attributed  the  existence  of the 
Phillips  curve  to  a  lag  of  money  wages  behind  prices. 
Neither,  however,  attempted  to  explain  why  the  wage 
lag  persists.  Nor  did  they  allow  for  the  formation  of 
price  expectations  or  for  the  incorporation  of  those 
expectations  into  the  Phillips  curve.  Instead,  they 
implicitly  assumed  that  the  anticipated  rate  of  infla- 
tion  was  always  zero,  thereby  omitting  a  crucial 
feature  of  modern  Phillips  curve  analysis,  namely 
the  assumption  that  expectations  are  formed  consis- 
tent  with  the  way  actual  inflation  is  generated  so  that 
those  expectations  are  correct  on  average.  Because 
of  this  omission,  they  could  hardly  be  expected  to 
explain  how  changes  in  inflationary  expectations 
alter  the  slope  of  the  Phillips  curve,  rendering  it 
vertical  at  the  natural  rate  of  unemployment.  In 
these  respects  at  least  they  differed  from  modern 
monetarist  critics  of  the  Phillips  curve. 
It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  Thornton’s  policy 
analysis  was  very  much  in  the  spirit  of  these  critics. 
Like  them,  he  did  not  believe  in  exploiting  the 
Phillips  curve  for  policy  purposes.  Like  them,  he 
stressed  the  costs  rather  than  the  benefits  of  inflation. 
And,  though  he  did  not  think  the  curve  was  vertical 
at  the  economy’s  normal  or  standard  level  of  output, 
he  did  think  it  was  very  steeply  sloped,  allowing  little 
increase  in  output  per  unit  rise  in  inflation.  For 
these  reasons,  although  he  enunciated  the  concept  of 
the  long-run  Phillips  curve,  he  cannot  be  considered 
an  enthusiastic  proponent  of  it.  Similarly,  although 
Hume  welcomed  gradual  metallic  inflation,  he  was 
unalterably  opposed  to  the  kind  of  rapid  paper  money 
inflation  that  is  unfortunately  so  common  today. 
Thus,  were  both  alive  today,  they  undoubtedly  would 
warn  against  using  over-expansionist  paper  money 
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